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For almost three decades, Argentina’s foreign debt was one of the main concerns of 
economic policy in the country. Despite this, both the record amount of the defaulted 
debt and the novel characteristics of its restructuring surprised many observers. We 
have analyzed the Argentine foreign debt problem, the default of part of the public 
debt in 2001 and the restructuring process in a number of papers, particularly in 
Damill, Frenkel and Rapetti (2010)3. In what follows we comment on some aspects of 
the issue that seem to be more relevant for present discussions. We start by briefly 
assessing three frequently mentioned arguments about the Argentine foreign debt and 




Let us first consider the argument that takes the Argentinean experience as an 
example of “debt intolerance.” Some economists include Argentina in a grouping of 
countries that carry an “original sin” of being serial defaulters and consequently suffer 
from debt intolerance. The extraordinary emphasis that the debt intolerance approach 
puts on both the remote past and rigid institutional features takes the focus away from 
what is the most fruitful perspective in an international comparative analysis of the 
external debt problem: the different policies followed by the countries in their 
processes of financial integration into the global system. In our analyses of the 
Argentine foreign debt we have paid special attention to the economic policies that 
framed Argentina’s external debt growth since the 1970s. We conclude that there is no 
supporting evidence for the “debt intolerance approach”. We show that by the end of 
the seventies the country had built up an intolerable debt burden. The origin of the 
external debt problem was not a remote “original sin” but a more recent original policy 
mistake—essentially, the combination of capital account opening, a fixed nominal 
exchange rate and an appreciated real exchange rate. That original policy mistake was 




The second argument we criticize is the one that takes the Argentine case as an 
example of how uncontrolled public spending is the main cause of the crisis and 
default. This is probably the most common, yet false, image of the Argentine case.  
A detailed examination of the fiscal accounts shows that the cumulative effects of the 
interest rate rise, which followed the increase in the country risk premium due to 
contagion after the Asian and Russian crises, caused the adverse public debt dynamics 
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in the last quarter of the nineties. Interest rates on Argentine public debt rose more 
than in many other countries in the region. The interest payment item was the main 
factor explaining the increase in the fiscal deficit in the 1998-2001 period leading up to 
the default. Indeed, the fiscal deficit increased despite a significant rise in the surplus 
in the primary balance.  In addition, the deficit of the pension system following the 
social security reform of 1994, partly privatizing the public system, also contributed to 
the increase in the fiscal deficit. The fall in the public pension system receipts also 
resulted from the recession and the employment contraction that started in mid-1998. 
In other words, the rise in the country risk premium and the interest rate can be 
associated with the fragile external accounts or, alternatively, with the evolution of 
public finances, or with both, as the investment fund analysts and the risk rating 
agencies actually wrote in their reports. However, even if the uncertainties regarding 
public debt sustainability weighed significantly in the investors’ assessments, this 
should not overshadow the original source of the rise in public deficits and debt in the 
late nineties. The main source was not mistaken but exogenously chosen expenditure 
and tax policy, but rather the compounded effects of inherent fragility of the external 
accounts and their vulnerability to the contagion of crises of confidence elsewhere. 
 
The Social Cost of the Default  
 
We also question the view that the default was the main factor responsible for 
Argentina’s deep economic crisis in the early part of the twenty first century and its 
high social cost. Our analyses show that the abrupt contraction in the activity and 
employment levels began, to a great extent, before the default, i.e., while the 
government subjected the country to big efforts to keep the debt servicing on track. 
The collapse of activity and employment was a consequence of the generalized rush to 
buy external assets and the resulting liquidity crunch. And then in the first quarter of 
2002, the real devaluation owing to the sharp fall in the peso exchange rate added 
another contractionary effect. However, the default also turned out to be one of the 
conditions that enabled the recovery that took place soon after. This was not only due 
to the positive fiscal effect of the payments suspension, but also a consequence of 
having freed the economic policy from the need to continuously issue signals aimed at 
facilitating the rollover of the debt obligations. It allowed the implementation of a 
pragmatic macroeconomic policy, focused on the stabilization of the exchange market 
and the quick recovery of fiscal revenues, which became feasible when no further new 
private or multilateral external fresh funds were needed. The success of this policy 
provided the base for the recovery.  
 
The Role of the IMF  
 
It is striking that Argentina’s crisis and the massive default took place in a country that 
for a long time was considered a Washington Consensus success. Almost until the end 
of the nineties, the IMF and most of the financial market analysts considered Argentina 
as one of the cases following macroeconomic policy and structural reforms 
appropriate for the era of financial globalization. In our view, the IMF’s advice was 
actually not helpful. In fact, the IMF’s commitment to the “convertibility regime” – 
particularly, the rescue package granted to the country at the end of 2000 and 
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extended in 2001—generated criticisms and conflicts within the institution and 
motivated a special investigation of the convertibility regime period by the Fund’s 
Independent Evaluation Office. The relationship between Argentina and the IMF was 
very different in the period following the default. The debt restructuring took place in 
the context of a conflictive relationship between the IMF and the country. The most 
unusual feature in this process was that the IMF did not participate in the design and 
management of the debt restructuring. Neither did the organization audit the 
government’s financial projections that justified the call for very deep dept reduction 
to achieve sustainability. The importance of this novelty is highlighted both by the 
record amount of debt that was restructured and by the unprecedented haircut, one 
of the highest in the debt restructuring history of the recent globalization period.  
 
The macroeconomic evolution in the nineties  
 
The basic plot of the macroeconomic story of the late nineties was quite simple. The 
negative financial turnaround in the foreign environment experienced in 1997-1998, 
after the East Asian and Russian crises, found the Argentine economy with a significant 
and growing current account deficit, a considerably appreciated currency and a visible 
lack of policy instruments to deal with these problems, given the rigidities of the 
adopted macroeconomic policy rule. In these conditions the country-risk premium 
jumped upwards and the access to foreign funds became more and more problematic. 
The subsequently increased interest burden had a negative impact on all borrowers, 
including the public sector.  
 
Because of the fixed exchange rate and dependence of monetary conditions on the 
balance of payments, fiscal policies had to bear the burden of the adjustment to the 
new situation. The government argued that furthering fiscal discipline would 
strengthen confidence, and consequently the risk premium would fall, bringing interest 
rates down. As a result, domestic expenditure would recover pushing the economy out 
of the recession. Lower interest rates and an increased GDP would, in turn, reestablish 
a balanced budget, thus closing a virtuous circle. Fernando de la Rúa’s administration 
in 2000 borrowed this entire argument from Carlos Menem’s administration which had 
preceded it, and the IMF gave its seal of approval. All of them failed.  
 
The entire macroeconomic story of the late nineties is about this failure. Despite the 
strong adjustment in the primary balance of the public sector the virtuous circle was 
never attained. Even worse, the increases in taxes and the cuts in public expenditures 
reinforced the recessionary trend, thus feeding the negative expectations that 
prevented realizing the highly anticipated fall in the country-risk premium. Fiscal policy 
alone was impotent to compensate for the strong macroeconomic imbalances, which 
laid somewhere else, i.e., in the external sector of the economy. Under this self-
destructive fiscal policy orientation, the economy got trapped into a vicious circle for 






The evolution of the fiscal accounts 
 
In the eighties the average deficit in the overall public sector was about 7% of GDP. 
The deficit decreased to less than 1% of GDP in 1991-94. This was mainly due to an 
improvement of 6 percentage points of GDP in the national administration balance, 
90% of which is explained by the shift in the primary balance. 
 
In 1994 the social security reform created the Private Pension Funds. One of the 
consequences was a considerable loss in contributions to the public subsystem. At the 
same time, in 1995 the economy went through a recession associated with the 
contagion of the Mexican crisis. Both factors negatively affected the public finances. 
But, in spite of these negative effects, between 1995 and 1997 the average fiscal 
deficit was – 2.6% of GDP, only 2 percentage points of GDP higher than the early 
nineties deficit. The increment is almost equivalent to the increase in the public social 
security subsystem disequilibrium caused by the reform. 
 
After 1997 the fiscal panorama changed significantly. The impact of the Russian and 
Brazilian crises in 1998 resulted in a new jump in country-risk premiums, which had 
already started rising in mid-1997, after the East Asian crisis. This negatively affected 
internal demand and triggered a new recessionary trend. On the other hand, it 
increased the financial vulnerability of debtors, including the public sector as well as 
many private agents that were in a net debtor position. The public sector’s deficit 
increased significantly reaching about 6 percent of GDP in 2001, despite the many 
rounds of contractionary fiscal policies adopted to stop the trend.  
 
The pro-cyclical fiscal policies implemented were not ineffective: they produced a 
substantial increase in the primary surplus (without including the public social security 
results) that averaged 1.4% of GDP, though that was not sufficient to compensate for 
the rises in the interest item and in the social security system disequilibrium. 
 
The amount of tax revenue absorbed by interest payments took a fast upward trend. 
In 2000, that ratio was nearly 19%, doubling the ratio registered in the middle of the 
decade. This was in part due to the decrease in tax revenues caused by the recession, 
but it fundamentally originated in the rise in the average interest rate paid on the 
public debt. The average interest rate on total public debt went from 5.8% in 1996 to 
9.4% in 2001. This is an average rate, the marginal rate raised considerably more. 
 
The rising path of the interest rate is associated with the increasing country-risk 
premium. These rising trends are the main factors behind both the consolidated deficit 
trajectory and the explosive path taken by the public debt. Between 1997 and 2001, in 
only four years, the public debt/GDP ratio increased by more than 20 percentage 
points.  
 
The Efforts to Prevent Default and Save the Currency Board Regime 
 
In December 1999 a newly elected government took office. The new De la Rúa 
administration adhered to the belief that the main cause of the economic depression 
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was not the exchange rate appreciation and the financial vulnerability to external 
shocks, but the fiscal mismanagement. This vision led the government to adopt a tight 
fiscal policy as a way to take the economy out of the recession. The failure of this 
policy orientation should not obscure the fact that huge efforts were made to balance 
the public accounts and to prevent the default of the government’s financial 
obligations. Successive packages of tight fiscal measures were applied during 2000 and 
2001.  
 
A Fiscal Responsibility Law approved in late 1999 set a mandatory declining trend for 
the public deficit that would bring it to zero in a few years. Tax increases and 
expenditure cuts were adopted with that purpose. Later on, by mid 2001 when the 
credit constraint had strengthened, a “zero deficit” policy was approved determining 
that the public accounts had to be immediately balanced (so that total expenditures 
had to be adjusted to total cash receipts). The package also included a 13% across the 
board cut in public wages and pension benefits. It should be kept in mind that these 
measures were taken when the economy was already ending its third recession year. 
These decisions exemplify the huge efforts made to prevent a default on the public 
debt. 
 
In any case, the expected positive "confidence shock" never materialized. With the 
economy suffering from a deep recession and caught in a debt trap, these rounds of 
contractionary fiscal policies only reinforced the deflationary scenario and the 
pessimistic expectations.  
 
During 2000 and 2001 the government attempted to complement its fiscal measures 
with some initiatives on the financial front. It obtained foreign support and 
implemented important debt swaps aiming to convince the public that there was no 
risk of default. Thus, at the end of 2000 an important package of local and external 
support, for about 40 billion dollars, was announced: (the “blindaje”, financial shield). 
The IMF led the operation with a 13.7 billion dollar extension of the stand-by credit in 
force since March 2000. Local agents including a group of banks and the private 
pension funds also had a significant participation. The beneficial effect of this action, 
however, was very short lived. Two months after its announcement, and following the 
outburst of a new crisis in Turkey, the country-risk premium started to climb again. 
 
The withdrawals from local bank deposits picked up speed in October 2000 and 
international reserves begun to fall. In March 2001, after the ephemeral recovery that 
followed the announcement of the blindaje, this process became more intense. 
Beginning in December the government established hard restrictions on capital 
movements and on cash withdrawals from banks (the so called “corralito”). One of the 
purposes of these measures was to avoid either the generalized bankruptcy of the 
banks or the violation of the currency board monetary rule. But the main objective of 
the measures was to hold back the demand for foreign currency, preserve the stock of 
reserves and avoid the devaluation (i.e. the formal abandonment of the convertibility 
regime). It was also the last drastic attempt to prevent the default. Yet, the measures 
actually did represent the end of the regime.  
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The restrictive December financial measures contributed to a deepening of the already 
strong social and political tensions. After a few days of social unrest and political 
commotion the government resigned, followed by a series of ephemeral presidents. 
One of them announced to the Congress the decision to default on the public debt, 
only to resign a few days later. In the first days of 2002, with a new president, 
Argentina officially abandoned the currency board regime and the one-to-one parity of 
the peso to the US dollar. 
The Bailout of the Financial System and the Evolution of the Debt after Default  
 
The suspension of the service payments on a part of the public debt was declared on 
December 24, 2001. The measure initially affected 61.8 billion dollars in public bonds 
and another 8 billion dollars in diverse liabilities, out of a total debt of 144.5 billion 
dollars. The rest—mainly debt with multilateral organizations (32.4 billion dollars) and 
recently issued guaranteed loans (42.3 billion dollars)—remained as performing debt.  
 
The devaluation of the peso that followed had a strong impact on the economy, given 
the important dollarization of contracts inherited from the convertibility period. The 
government interventions beginning in early 2002 aimed both to reduce the wealth 
transfer from debtors to creditors and avoid the collapse that would have resulted 
from being unable to fulfill domestic contracts set in US dollars. The official 
intervention intended to manage the “distribution of losses”. In many cases the 
intervention meant that parts of the losses were absorbed by the State by issuing new 
debt.  
 
The main source of the new indebtedness came from the intervention in the financial 
system, which involved a 14.4 billion dollar rise in public debt. In February 2002, the 
government decided to compel the conversion of all foreign-currency bank deposits 
into pesos at a rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar. Withdrawals from demand and saving 
deposits were restricted to 1,500 pesos per week. The rest of the deposit balances in 
the banks as of the end of 2001 was transformed into longer term deposits. This 
measure included both the deposits recently converted from dollars to pesos and 
those originally denominated in pesos. Bank credits denominated in foreign currency 
were converted into pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar. This measure was aimed at 
avoiding generalized bankruptcies in the private sector. The “asymmetric pesification” 
of credits and deposits caused a significant loss in banks’ net worth that was 
compensated by the government. 
 
Considering the different measures and effects derived from the management of the 
convertibility collapse and the declaration of default, between December 2001 and 
December 2003 the gross public debt stock increased by about 28.2 billion dollars 
(23% of 2003 GDP). By the end of 2003, Argentina’s total public debt reached 179 




The Public Debt Swap 
 
In the second half of 2003 the first official steps for the restructuring of the defaulted 
debt were taken. In September, after reaching an agreement with the IMF, the 
government took advantage of the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in 
Dubai to make public the main guidelines and the agenda of their restructuring 
proposal. 
 
The “Dubai proposal” established that Argentina would offer uniform treatment to 
every holder of its bonds issued up to December 2001, while still fully servicing its 
multilateral debt and the guaranteed loans issued in 2001. The government thus 
recognized a defaulted stock of bonds of about 87 billion dollars. This amount left 
aside an important volume of past due interest. A 75% haircut was to be imposed on 
the bonds, according to which new bonds would issued in a swap that would leave the 
equivalent of a maximum amount of bonds of about 21.8 billion dollars. Three bonds, 
called Par, Quasi-Par and Discount, were announced. Although the detailed 
characteristics of the instruments were not published at the time, their outlines were 
clear. The Par would preserve the nominal value of the original debt but would have 
longer maturity and a lower interest rate than the other two. The other two bonds 
would entail nominal haircuts. The haircut corresponding to the Discount bond would 
be higher than the haircut of the Quasi-Par. The new bonds would also incorporate 
mechanisms—which would be specified later on—to reward the bondholders with a 
coupon tied to the economic rate of growth. The sustainability of the proposal was 
said to be consistent with a target for the primary surplus that had been recently 
agreed upon with the IMF (2.4% of GDP for the central government and 3% for the 
consolidated public sector). The government announced that it expected to maintain 
that target in the long run. 
 
The voices of the financial market expressed strong disapproval. It was said that 
Argentina was in a position to make a much better offer—from the creditor 
perspective—by targeting a higher primary surplus. The IMF exerted pressure on the 
government in many ways and repeatedly called for signs of “good-faith”.  
 
In June 2004, a few months after the finance ministers of the Group of 7 manifested 
that Argentina should accelerate the restructuring process and issue “good faith” 
signals, the government made public a new proposal in Buenos Aires. It was a second 
offer that aimed to get closer to the creditors’ positions. The eligible debt was the 
same as the one defined in Dubai, although it was now measured at 81.8 billion 
dollars. In exchange for that defaulted debt stock, new bonds would be issued for a 
total of 38.5 billion dollars, in case the level of acceptance of the swap was lower than 
70%, and for 41.8 billion dollars in case the level of acceptance was higher than the 
70% benchmark. This offer involved a substantial improvement if compared to the 
21.8 billion dollars to be issued according to the Dubai proposal. The swap would 
comprise only the capital of the defaulted bonds while the past due interests would 
not be recognized; i.e. liabilities amounting to 81.8 billion dollars would be exchanged 
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for new bonds amounting to 38.5 or 41.8 billion dollars, depending on the level of 
acceptance.  
 
The three instruments announced in Dubai were maintained in the Buenos Aires 
proposal. It was established that the issuing date would be December 31, 2003 and 
that the bonds would accrue interest from then. The offer to include a coupon tied to 
GDP growth was also maintained. It was announced that the Par and Discount bonds 
could be issued in “CER-adjusted pesos,” US dollars, euros and yen. The Quasi-Par 
bond would be exclusively issued in CER-adjusted pesos. 
 
The offer specified a Par bond issuance of 10 billion dollars if acceptance was not 
higher than 70% and of 15 billion dollars in the opposite case. This instrument would 
recognize the original nominal value of the defaulted bond, would have a 35-year 
maturity and would have fixed interest rates (in dollars) rising from 1.33% during the 
first 5 years to 5.25% in the last 10 years. 
 
For the Discount bond, an issuance was announced of approximately 20.17 billion 
dollars in the low acceptance scenario and of about 19.87 billion dollars in the more 
optimistic one. The new bond would entail a 66.3% haircut on the original nominal 
debt value, would have a 30-year maturity and would yield an increasing fixed interest, 
part of which would be capitalized throughout the first 10 years. 
 
The Quasi-Par bond was designed to take into account the local institutional holders’ 
needs—mainly the private pension funds—and involved a 30.1% haircut. The 
announced issuance amount was about 24.3 billion pesos (about 8.33 billion dollars) 
independent of the degree of acceptance. The instrument would have a 42-year 
maturity, yielding a fixed 3.31% interest rate in pesos, with capitalization of interest 
during the first 15 years. 
 
The announcement made in June also specified the characteristics of the coupons tied 
to GDP growth. GDP-linked units would be issued in an amount equal to the amount of 
the bonds effectively swapped. The units could be separated from the bonds and 
quoted independently 6 months after the swap. Payments depended on the level of 
real GDP relative to a “base GDP,” which rises over time. The “base GDP” was defined 
as the GDP resulting from about a 3% average annual growth rate, using the GDP of 
2004 as a starting point. The units would then pay a return if real GDP was above the 
base level and also grew more than 3% in the previous year. Payment to all units 
together would then be set at 5% of the amount by which GDP exceeded the base 
level and this amount converted into foreign exchange would be distributed to unit 
holders in corresponding proportions.  
 
In comparison to the Dubai proposal, the Buenos Aires proposal involved a tighter path 
of fiscal policy in the future. Instead of the 2.4% of GDP target in Dubai, the 
government announced that in order to ensure the offer’s financial consistency, it was 
committed to maintaining a primary surplus target of 2.7% of GDP during the first 5 
years—when the service of the debt issued post default was concentrated—and then 
stabilize the primary surplus at around 2.3% of GDP from 2014 on. With this program 
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and a 3.3% annual average economic growth assumption, the projections indicated 
that the fiscal effort would finance the interest payments. However, it left aside a 
relevant proportion of the capital maturities, for which funding sources had to be 
obtained. If the multilateral organizations agreed to the refinancing of their debt 
amortizations, the government would still have to obtain annual funding for about 2% 
of GDP to face other principal payments coming due during the first 10 years after the 
swap. 
 
The evidence that Argentina would continue supporting a heavy debt burden after the 
swap did not ease the creditors’ demands. Immediately after the announcement in 
June, the bondholders’ organizations rejected the proposal, claiming that the country 
should pay more than what was offered. The financial analyses showed that the new 
offer, including the coupons tied to GDP growth, was between 20 and 27 cents on the 
dollar. This signified a haircut of about 73% to 80%, which was considered 
unacceptable by the market participants. The calculation of the haircut compared the 
nominal value of the defaulted debt with the present value of the new bonds and thus 
the discount rate used in these latter calculations was crucial to the result. Most of the 
analysts considered it reasonable at the time to use the yield on assets of similar-risk 
emerging market countries, which at that moment was around 12-14%. Brazil’s debt 
was commonly used as a benchmark. Its yield then oscillated around 12%. The debt of 
Ecuador, a country that had recently restructured its external liabilities, yielded a rate 
close to 14%. High yields were a consequence of the unfavorable funding conditions 
that the developing countries faced at that time. The JP Morgan EMBI+ index showed 
an average value of 502 basis points in May-June. In the same period Brazil’s country 
risk-premium averaged 691 basis points. 
 
By late 2004, however, the international capital markets evolution unexpectedly 
started to play in favor of the Argentinean offer. There was an increasing demand for 
emerging market debt and a reduction of the developing countries’ risk premium. The 
EMBI+ index decreased to an average of 375 basis points in the last quarter of the 
year, whereas the Brazilian country risk-premium fell to 417 basis points. The yield of 
Brazilian debt was about 9-10% and the yield of Ecuador’s bonds was about 11-12%. In 
this new context, the swap looked more attractive. The present value of the offered 
bonds calculated with the lower discount rate was between 30 and 35 cents per dollar. 
This present value represented a 65-70% haircut and was similar to the market price of 
the defaulted bonds. 
 
The improvement in the financial environment did not stop the pressures for a better 
offer; but it did pave the way for the government to finally launch the swap, practically 
without introducing any change to the proposal announced in June 2004. To put 
pressure on the bondholders, the government mentioned that it would be satisfied 
with a 50% level of acceptance and warned the bondholders that there would be 
another offer.  
 
The swap started on January 14, 2005. Six weeks later, the restructuring operation was 
closed. On May 3, 2005, the government announced that acceptance of its offer had 
reached 76.15% of the debt in default. This meant that 62.3 billion dollars of the old 
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bonds would be exchanged for about 35.3 billion dollars of new instruments plus the 
corresponding GDP growth-linked coupons. The maximum amount of the issuing 
would be 15 billion dollars in the case of the Par bonds, 8.33 billion dollars in the case 
of the Quasi-Par bonds and about 11.9 billion dollars in the case of the Discount bonds. 
 
The government expressed satisfaction at the swap’s outcome. The operation signified 
the reduction in the public debt stock by about 67.3 billion dollars and attenuated the 
public finances’ exposure to the exchange risk, since around 44% of the new bonds 
were denominated in local currency. 
 
Macroeconomic Policy and Performance after Devaluation and Default 
 
After three years of recession, economic activity had suffered from an additional 
abrupt decline in the second half of 2001. The massive flight to external assets that 
took place in the second semester precipitated the collapse of the convertibility 
regime and resulted in the devaluation of the peso and the default. There was a strong 
fall in reserves during that year, which rapidly shrank domestic liquidity. The payments 
chain collapsed after the corralito was established. Output and employment followed 
the abrupt contractive trajectory showed by reserves and liquidity. Social indicators 
such us the unemployment rate and the poverty and indigence indices—which had 
considerably worsened during the nineties—suffered from an additional deterioration, 
adding to the social tensions and the politic crisis that brought the government of the 
Alianza to an end. 
 
The abrupt fall in output and employment continued after the end of the convertibility 
regime, but for only a very short period. Certainly, in opposition to most opinions and 
beliefs—including those of the IMF’s officials—the traumatic episodes that brought the 
convertibility regime to an end were not followed by a deeper depression. Moreover, 
an extraordinary quick recovery started only one quarter after the devaluation and 
default. the GDP recovery started soon after the exchange rate depreciation (around 
three months later, as can be seen in the available monthly activity indicators).  
 
The recovery was precisely triggered by the sudden change in the relative prices in 
favor of the tradable goods sectors. In the beginning of this phase the recovery was led 
by the local production of previously imported goods. Apart from the shift in relative 
prices, the quick economic recovery that followed the crisis was also a consequence of 
a set of policies that, still with flaws and ambiguities, aimed at recovering the basic 
macroeconomic equilibria. 
 
Many of the policies that played important roles in this stage faced opposition from 
the IMF. Firstly, the imposition of exchange controls: this measure compelled the 
exporters to liquidate in the local market a considerable part of the international 
currency generated by their exports and also restricted capital outflows. Secondly, the 
establishment of taxes on exports (retentions): this absorbed part of the devaluation’s 
favorable effect on the exporters’ incomes and significantly contributed to the 
recovery of fiscal equilibrium; it also attenuated the impact of the devaluation on 
domestic prices and, consequently, on real wages. Thirdly, a flexible monetary policy: 
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this initially enabled assistance to banks in the crisis phase and afterwards contributed 
to the recovery of money demand, thus helping the recovery. Fourthly, when the 
foreign exchange market started to show an excess supply of international currency, 
exchange rate policy attempted to stop the peso from appreciating through the 
intervention of the Central Bank (and of the Treasury later on).  
 
The IMF particularly insisted on a freely floating peso. For a short period the 
government adopted this regime. Once the exchange rate was free to float, however, 
the parity rose abruptly, reaching levels close to 4 pesos per dollar. Reintroduction of 
exchange controls followed, which was crucial to contain the exchange rate 
overshooting. The government managed to stabilize the nominal exchange rate by 
mid-2002 by compelling the exporters to liquidate the international currency in the 
local exchange market and by limiting the currency outflows. 
 
Soon after, when the exchange rate was stabilized, the demand for pesos started to 
recover and the exchange market began to show an excess supply of dollars. The end 
of the exchange rate overshooting put a check on the rise in the domestic prices. The 
freezing of public utilities rates, as well as the high unemployment (which kept nominal 
wages from rising) also contributed to slow the rise in prices.  
 
Another important point in the tense relations of the country with the IMF relates to 
the net flow of funds between Argentina and IMF and the other multilateral 
organizations. In this regard, a substantial change occurred after the end of the 
convertibility regime; i.e., in the post default phase the net funding from the IMF and 
the other multilateral organizations became negative. According to the Argentinean 
Minister of the Economy, the IMF passed from playing the role of “last-resort lender” 
to play the role of “privileged debt payment collector”.  
 
Whereas in the 1994-2001 period Argentina received from the multilateral 
organizations a net funding of more than 23 billion dollars (40% of which were 
concentrated in 2001), in the 2002-2005 phase the country made net payments 
amounting more than 14 billion dollars  (including interest payments). In 2005 the 
government decided to prepay all outstanding liabilities still owed to the IMF, and that 
explains the significant size of the negative bar attributed to 2006 in the graph. 
 
The GDP recovery that started in the first half of 2002 had a short first phase in which 
aggregate demand barely rose and in which every internal component of domestic 
expenditure (private consumption, public consumption, and investment) kept 
shrinking, as had also happened, though at a low pace, during the previous depression. 
Therefore, it was not growth of domestic demand that stopped the decline in activity 
level. The expansive factors were mainly the international trade variables: exports and 
the switching of expenditure from imports to import substitutes—most especially the 
latter, as local expenditure on local production started to provide an increasing 
proportion of aggregate demand. This import substitution particularly favored the 
manufacturing sector. After that short initial stage, the recovery of activity was led by 
an increase in domestic demand components, especially by investment, which grew at 
an annualized rate close to 40% between 2002 and 2004, and by private consumption. 
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It is frequently mentioned that a favorable external environment was an important 
element behind the economic recovery. In this view, the main part of the rebound is 
attributed to a set of positive “exogenous” factors. In those interpretations, the 
recovery would have taken place in spite of what is often considered an economic 
policy full of mistakes and omissions. Although the contribution of external factors to 
recovery has been undeniable (in particular some high commodity prices), the fact that 
a substantial part of the expansion’s dynamism derived from internal demand sources 
weakens that interpretation. 
 
It should also be stressed that the consumption and investment recovery took place in 
a context of heightened credit rationing, both external and internal. The investment 
was apparently financed by higher profits retained by firms, although the “wealth 
effect” resulting from the significant external asset holdings of the private resident 
sector, surely contributed as well. These assets increased their value in pesos with the 
exchange rate depreciation, and also rose in relation to the prices of domestic assets 
such as real estate and land. This factor also fed the recovery of private consumption 
expenditure.  
 
The adjustment experienced by the Argentinean external sector took place in part 
before the devaluation. However, the end of convertibility generated an important 
trade surplus. The trade balance exhibited a deficit higher than 3 billion dollars in 
1998. It decreased from then on and turned into surplus, due to the reduction in the 
volume of imports. In 2002 the surplus was higher than 17 billion dollars, and 
remained over 16 billion in 2003 and over 12 billion in 2004. The trade surplus caused 
the change of sign in the current account balance.  
 
A strong adjustment in the public accounts has also been taking place alongside the 
external adjustment process we have just mentioned.  
 
The improvement in the consolidated public sector global balance that took place 
between 2001 and 2004 was equivalent to 10 percentage points of GDP. This result 
passed from a global deficit of 5.6% of GDP in 2001 to a 4.5% surplus in 2004. 
 
Which factors explain the adjustment in the fiscal cash flow results? Forty percent of it 
derives from an improvement in the provinces balances. This improvement comes 
from the increase in tax collection facilitated by the recovery and the rise in nominal 
prices, together with the restraint in expenditure. Meanwhile, 60% of the six-points-
adjustment in the national public sector’s budget is explained by the improvement in 
the primary balance (+3.7% of GDP). The contraction of interest payments, basically 
resulting from the default on the sovereign debt, accounts for the rest (-2.4% of GDP). 
 
The rise in the national primary surplus is mainly explained by an improvement in tax 
revenues (+4.7% of GDP). It is interesting to observe that although the receipts from 
traditional taxes such as the VAT and the incomes tax rose significantly, they did not 
increase substantially when measured as a proportion of GDP. Between 2001 and 2004 
they increased by 1.2% of GDP taken together. The tax on exports is the item that 
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mostly explains the rise in tax revenues. The soy and derivatives industry generated 
almost one half of the taxes on exports. 
 
Hence, the public sector absorbed part of the effect of the devaluation on the 
profitability of the tradable goods sector, and also benefited from the high prices 
reached by some of the exportable goods, such as soy and oil. The contribution made 
by the tax on financial operations established in 2001 was also very relevant. The 
increase in the collection of this tax explains 30% of the improvement in total tax 
receipts. 
 
The interest payments on the public debt passed from representing almost 4% of GDP 
in 2001 to only 1.4% in 2004 (without taking into account the accrued interest on the 
debt in default). 
 
However, the fiscal effects of the suspension of part of the debt service payments are 
significantly higher than what is shown in the mentioned account. It cannot be 
calculated with precision because a significant amount of new debt was issued after 
the suspension of debt payments. However it can be estimated that the amount of 
interest on the public debt—valued at the 2004 exchange rate—would have 
represented, in that year, between 9 and 11 percent of GDP. This is approximately 
equivalent to one half of the total tax collection of that year. Paying that amount 
would have certainly been incompatible with the economic recovery. As was pointed 
out above, a crucial aspect of the fiscal financial vulnerability derived from the 
extremely high proportion of debt in foreign currency, with the consequent exposure 
to the impact of exchange rate variation. The substantial exchange rate depreciation in 
2002 would have had a harsh impact on the public sector’s financial equilibrium. 
Taking this into account, it can be said that the payment suspension and the following 
debt restructuring enabled a considerable amount of fiscal savings—either measured 
in domestic currency or as a proportion of GDP. 
 
However, the most important effect of the default and the end of the convertibility 
regime was regaining the instruments of macroeconomic policy. This was of crucial 
importance in moving the economy out of the abysmal situation generated by the 
agony and the final collapse of the convertibility regime. 
 
